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Abstract
Matching university places to students is not as clear cut or as straightforward as it ought
to be. By investigating the matching algorithm used by the German central clearinghouse for
university admissions in medicine and related subjects, we show that a procedure designed to give
an advantage to students with excellent school grades actually harms them. The reason is that
the three-step process employed by the clearinghouse is a complicated mechanism in which many
students fail to grasp the strategic aspects involved. The mechanism is based on quotas and consists
of three procedures that are administered sequentially, one for each quota. Using the complete data
set of the central clearinghouse, we show that the matching can be improved for around 20% of
the excellent students while making a relatively small percentage of all other students worse off.
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1 Introduction 
Matching students to universities has always been beset with some difficulties. In 
this paper, we analyze a new class of matching problems for a college admissions 
procedure that is based on three distinct quotas. Within each quota, a different 
criterion, such as the average grade or a certain social characteristic, is applied. 
These quotas are filled sequentially and, in principle, every applicant is 
considered under all quotas. This is the matching scheme that is currently 
employed by the German central clearinghouse for university admissions in 
medicine and related subjects.  
The sequential matching scheme employed by the clearinghouse provides 
incentives to behave strategically. This is particularly true for applicants with 
excellent grades. These strategic aspects have important implications for the 
matching outcome: To the extent that applicants do not understand the strategic 
incentives of the matching scheme, the procedure designed to give excellent 
applicants an advantage in the admission process can harm them instead.  
The impetus of our study lies in its contribution to the analysis of existing 
centralized matching schemes in markets of admissions to public schools and 
universities. While the German case is of specific interest for policy-makers in 
Germany, centralized institutions for university admissions also exist in other 
countries – for example, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and 
Turkey1 – some of which use similar matching schemes. The German 
clearinghouse uses the well-known Gale-Shapley algorithm and the Boston 
mechanism, a priority matching scheme used by many school districts in the U.S. 
to assign children to public schools. The distinguishing feature of the mechanism 
we analyze is that these widely used algorithms are applied sequentially and that 
applicants can submit different rank-order lists for each of the three procedures. 
We can therefore directly observe whether the lists differ and how they are 
affected by the matching algorithm and by the sequence of the procedures. 
The three procedures were created to fill the three different quotas. In 
particular, the procedures are designed (1) to give students with excellent grades a 
very good chance to be admitted to their preferred university, (2) to admit students 
with long waiting times, and (3) to allow universities to admit students according 
to their own preferences. In the first two procedures the Boston algorithm, and in 
the third procedure the college-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm, are applied. 
                                                
1 In the U.K., universities pick students themselves, but the application procedures are centralized 
at UCAS (http://www.ucas.ac.uk). In France, a central clearinghouse handles applications to 
universities as in the U.K. with the special feature that several rounds of offers, rejections, and new 
offers are possible (see http://www.admission-postbac.org). In the Netherlands, a centralized 
matching scheme is used for about 50% of all seats. For a study of the mechanism used in Turkey 
see Balinski and Sönmez (1999). 
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Both of these algorithms have been widely studied in the literature and we will 
review them in due course.  
Within the current procedure, so-called school choice and college 
admissions procedures are combined. In college admissions, universities state 
their own preferences over applicants (as in the third part of the current 
mechanism) whereas in school choice schools are duty bound to admit students 
according to a set of preordained priorities (as under the quotas for students with 
excellent grades or long waiting times).  
We investigate the applicants’ incentives and behavior under the matching 
mechanism and assess the stability and efficiency of the resulting matching. It is 
straightforward to show that the overall mechanism, encompassing the three 
procedures, is not strategy-proof. That is, revealing one’s true preferences is not a 
dominant strategy. Using detailed records on students’ choices, characteristics, 
and assignments, we empirically study whether the preference lists submitted by 
applicants reflect their true preferences or, alternatively, whether students submit 
manipulated lists. By doing so, we evaluate to what extent applicants understand 
the strategic properties of the application process.  
The rationale for focusing on strategic behavior is that these choices affect 
the matching outcome. While certain forms of strategic behavior can lead to 
inefficient and unstable outcomes, other types of manipulations are necessary to 
achieve an efficient and stable matching. In particular, the first procedure will 
harm rather than help excellent students if top students fail to fully understand the 
strategic properties of the mechanism and thus do not manipulate their rank-order 
lists accordingly.  
The main results can briefly be summarized as follows. We test three 
hypotheses regarding the strategic behavior of applicants. First, we demonstrate 
that due to the Boston algorithm applied in the first two procedures, a 
considerable number of applicants manipulate their preference lists for these two 
quotas so that it is consistent with the incentives created by the algorithm. As the 
Boston algorithm assigns as many applicants as possible to their first choice and 
considers second choices only if there are still seats left after the first round, 
students refrain from listing very popular universities on lower ranks of their list.  
Our second and third empirical tests make use of the fact that the 
mechanism consists of three separate procedures applied sequentially. The criteria 
used in the three procedures differ, and for each of the procedures students can 
submit a separate list ranking their preferred universities. We find evidence that 
the preference lists submitted differ substantially between the procedures. 
Moreover, the differences between the lists can be explained with the respective 
criteria applied for the three quotas, which indicates strategic considerations by 
the applicants.  
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Finally, we show that a significant proportion of applicants with excellent 
grades truncate their preference lists in the first procedure. They do that because 
they do not want to be matched too early, since only those students who were not 
matched previously are considered in subsequent procedures of the mechanism. 
Excellent applicants expect to have another chance to get into their preferred 
university under the quota where universities select the students according to their 
own criteria. As we will demonstrate, such truncated lists in the first procedure are 
necessary to achieve a stable matching. As a downside, truncations by excellent 
students lead to excessive admission of students with long waiting times at the 
expense of students with good but not excellent grades.  
In order to evaluate the efficiency of the matching, we run simulations. 
After inferring the true preferences of students from the submitted rank-order lists, 
we can compare the allocations achieved by different mechanisms and strategies. 
Our main finding is that excellent students are made worse off by the quota for 
excellent students. The matching of students with excellent grades could be 
greatly improved simply by removing this quota and moving the open seats to the 
procedure where the universities select students themselves.  
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section briefly reviews the 
related literature. We then describe the rules currently applied by the central 
clearinghouse and analyze the incentives of applicants to misrepresent their true 
preferences. Three hypotheses are formulated that can be tested with the data. In 
Section 4, we describe the data set used, and in Section 5 we report on a number 
of tests designed to understand whether individuals behave strategically. Section 6 
analyzes the efficiency and stability of the current as well as alternative 
mechanisms, and in Section 7, we discuss possible ways to improve the 
mechanism. Section 8 concludes. 
2 Related Literature 
Our study is most closely related to Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, Roth and Sönmez 
(2006) who investigate the strategic behavior of applicants for school seats in 
Boston, using data from the actual admissions process, as we do. But because the 
German mechanism differs from the algorithm employed in Boston, we have 
developed a number of new methods to detect strategic choices. In addition, the 
possibility to submit a different preference list for each of the three procedures 
allows us to use the variation in stated preferences across procedures to test for 
strategic behavior. Moreover, as we argue in Section 6, the specific properties of 
the German mechanism allow us to infer the true preferences from the rank-order 
lists submitted by the students. With simulations, we can therefore evaluate the 
efficiency and stability of the mechanisms.  
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Among the first studies to evaluate a matching algorithm empirically is an 
analysis of the mechanism to allocate Harvard student housing (Collins and 
Krishna, 1997). An interesting feature of this study is that questionnaires are used 
to elicit information about the true preferences which were then compared to the 
lists submitted. 
University admissions in the U.S. have been studied with a focus on the 
strategic behavior of applicants in response to the rules governing early 
applications (Avery, Fairbanks, and Zeckhauser, 2004). Colleges are more likely 
to admit an early applicant than a regular applicant with the same qualifications 
and the main reason for applicants to apply early is to therefore increase their 
chances of being admitted. As a second indicator of strategic behavior, Avery et 
al. observe that when Stanford and Yale switched from Early Decision to Early 
Action,2 the number of early applicants to those universities increased 
dramatically. 
Our hypotheses regarding the applicants’ strategic choices are supported 
by the findings of Westkamp (2009) who provides a theoretical analysis of the 
German mechanism for university admissions. Moreover, we can draw on the 
results by Roth (1991), who considered priority matching algorithms in the 
context of markets for doctors in Britain, and we make use of the results by Roth 
and Vande Vate (1991) as well as by Roth and Peranson (1999) regarding the 
strategic properties of the college-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm. 
A number of studies analyze the Boston mechanism. While the outcome of 
the Boston mechanism is Pareto efficient if all applicants submit their true 
preferences, it is not in the best interest of applicants to do so (Abdulkadiroglu 
and Sönmez, 2003). Given strategic choices, the set of equilibrium allocations of 
the Boston mechanism is weakly dominated by the student-optimal stable 
matching (Ergin and Sönmez, 2006). If there are sincere applicants who report 
their true preferences and sophisticated players who play a best response, then 
sophisticated students can be better off in the Boston mechanism than in the 
student-optimal stable mechanism (Pathak and Sönmez, 2008).  
The theoretical literature has been complemented by experimental 
evidence. In general, the Boston mechanism performs poorly in the lab when 
compared to Gale and Shapley’s deferred-acceptance mechanism (Chen and 
Sönmez, 2006). Experiments by Pais and Pintér (2008) find a positive correlation 
between the amount of information available and the proportion of strategic 
choices in the Boston mechanism. These studies highlight the problem of strategic 
behavior under the Boston mechanism and are able to quantify the inefficiencies 
created by the Boston mechanism in the lab.  
                                                
2 With Early Decision, applicants are only allowed to apply to one specific university. With Early 
Action, students are allowed to apply to several universities. 
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Finally, the Gale-Shapley student-optimal stable mechanism can be 
combined with flexible type-specific quotas (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 2003). 
The main difference to our mechanism is that students can only belong to one 
type, and are therefore only eligible for a single quota. 
3 The Student Mechanism 
Under the German system, university admissions for medical subjects are all 
centrally administered. Prospective students of biology, medicine, pharmacy, 
psychology, animal health, and dentistry have to send their application to the 
central clearinghouse. Students can apply only in one of the six fields 
administered by the clearinghouse but are free to apply additionally in any field 
not administered by the clearinghouse.3 
The central clearinghouse assigns students according to the following 
three procedures that are implemented in a sequential order: 
(1) Procedure A admits students who are top of the class to around 20% of all 
seats. 
(2) Procedure W admits students with long waiting times to around 20% of all 
seats. 
(3) Procedure U represents admission by universities according to their own 
criteria to around 60% of all seats.4 
For each of these procedures, applicants are asked to submit a preference 
ranking of universities. They are allowed to rank no more than six universities in 
procedures A and U. Only in procedure W do they have the option to add all other 
universities to the bottom of their list without ranking them. 
All three procedures are two-stage procedures. At the first stage, 
applicants are selected (“selection”). At the second stage, the selected applicants 
compete for admission to one of their preferred universities (“admission”). At this 
second stage, the Boston mechanism is applied in procedures A and W while in 
procedure U the college-proposing Gale-Shapley mechanism is used. When 
submitting their preference lists, applicants do not know for certain whether they 
will be selected in the first stage of any of the three procedures. 
                                                
3 Some years ago, subjects such as business administration, economics, and architecture were also 
administered by the central clearinghouse, but they were decentralized as soon as the number of 
applicants dropped relative to the number of open seats. The introduction of the Bachelor’s degree 
instead of the diploma in biology and psychology implies that from the winter term 2009/10 on, 
the central clearinghouse administers only the four remaining subjects. We are grateful to 
Bernhard Scheer of the ZVS for this information. 
4 The German terms for the three procedures are Abiturbestenverfahren, Wartezeitverfahren, and
Auswahlverfahren der Hochschulen. 
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After conducting the admission process, the central clearinghouse 
publishes detailed information on the application characteristics of admitted 
candidates for every university-subject combination. This includes the minimum 
requirements in terms of grade, waiting time, and/or social criteria for a successful 
application. Hence applicants are informed about the popularity of the different 
subjects and universities within the three procedures in previous years. We expect 
that applicants use this information about the past and compare their 
characteristics to historical thresholds when making their choices.  
3.1 Procedure A 
Procedure A is employed to reward excellent average grades in the Abitur (i.e., 
the average final grade from secondary school). In order to fill the quota for 
excellent students, applicants with the best average grades are selected at the first 
stage of the procedure.5 Whether an applicant is selected or not only depends on 
his personal characteristics, that is, on the average final grade from school and 
possibly on subordinated criteria.6 His or her stated preference ranking of 
universities cannot influence the outcome of the selection stage. In our analysis, 
we will concentrate on the second stage, at which the selected applicants compete 
for admission to one of their preferred universities and at which stated preferences 
matter. The admission algorithm assigns as many applicants as possible to their 
first choice and considers second choices only if there are still seats left at the end 
of the first round.  
More specifically, the algorithm of procedure A can be described as 
follows: 
Step 1: Only the first preferences of the applicants are considered. For 
each university, admit the selected applicants who have ranked it as their first 
choice, until there are no seats left or until all candidates ranking this university as 
their first choice have been admitted. If there are more candidates giving priority 
to a university than can be admitted, those applicants with the best grades in the 
Abitur are admitted. Social criteria and (subordinately) lotteries are used to break 
ties. 
                                                
5 Due to the federal structure of the German educational system, every federal state in Germany 
has its own Abitur with its particular combination of subjects and grading system. In order to 
guarantee equal chances of admission to universities in spite of the federal school system, 
competition for admission is not nationwide but takes place only among applicants who have 
passed their Abitur in the same federal state. A detailed description of the selection stage can be 
found in Braun and Dwenger (2009). 
6 Subordinated criteria for selection are waiting time, military or civil service, and a lottery. 
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Step k: Only the kth preference of the still unassigned applicants is 
considered. For each university with available seats, admit the selected applicants 
who have ranked it as their kth choice, until there are no seats left or until all 
candidates ranking the university as their kth choice have been admitted. If there 
are more candidates giving the rank k to a university than can be admitted, those 
applicants with the best average final grade from school are admitted. Social 
criteria and (subordinately) lotteries are used to break ties. 
The algorithm stops after step k ≤ 6 when every selected applicant is 
assigned or when all 6 preferences have been considered. This means that some 
applicants may have been selected but remain unassigned even though there are 
still open seats at some universities. This is the case when universities with open 
seats have not been listed by the unmatched applicants.  
Note that the algorithm does not eliminate justified envy (see Example 1 
in the appendix). A matching can result in which an applicant prefers to be 
matched with a certain university over his actual matching outcome, and the 
university prefers this applicant over the applicant whom it has actually admitted. 
In addition, under the Boston mechanism it is not a dominant strategy to state 
one’s preferences truthfully. In procedure A (and in procedure W, too, as we will 
see in the following), an applicant ranking a university in kth position is admitted 
before applicants ranking a university in (k+1)th position are considered                
– independently of her average grade. Hence, it may be advantageous for 
applicants to manipulate their true preference ordering. 
In a leaflet, the German central clearinghouse points out that the chances 
of being admitted depend on the rank-order submitted (ZVS, 2006a, translated by 
the authors): 
“If you could not be admitted to your top university, the central clearing 
house considers your second preferred university. However, at this university 
priority is given to all those applicants who top-ranked this university. This means 
that your chances of being admitted at a lower ranked university are worsened 
depending on the overall demand.” 
3.2 Procedure W 
Procedure W is employed to reward the number of terms an applicant had to wait 
for admission since finishing secondary school.7 First, the applicants with the 
                                                
7 The procedure based on waiting time fulfils the requirement of the German constitutional court’s 
ruling on university admissions (Numerus-clausus-Urteil, 1972, BVerfGE 33, 303). It stipulates 
that the admission criteria have to be such that in principle every applicant, who holds the right to 
enter a university (e.g., through passing the Abitur), has a chance to be admitted. 
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longest waiting times are selected.8 At the second stage, admission is organized 
based on stated preferences and using the Boston mechanism just as in procedure 
A. The only difference between procedure A and W is the set of criteria applied to 
break ties between applicants giving the same rank to a university that does not 
have enough seats left to admit all of its applicants. In procedure W, emphasis is 
put on social criteria, the most important being the proximity of a university to the 
parents’ house.9 Second preferences are again only considered if there are still 
seats left after the first round. This implies that procedure W is not strategy-proof 
either.  
To analyze behavior in procedures A and W, we adapt a definition of 
Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, Roth and Sönmez (2006) to our context: 
Definition: A university is over-demanded for a given subject and within 
a given procedure if only selected applicants who have ranked the university as 
their first choice have a chance of being admitted.  
By this definition, the number of applicants ranking an over-demanded 
university as their first choice will exceed the number of seats available. Thus, it 
is never successful to rank this university second or lower. For each subject and 
university, applicants are informed about the previous years’ preferences, grades, 
and social criteria that were necessary to be admitted. These threshold values are 
highly correlated over the years. Therefore, we formulate  
Hypothesis 1: In procedures A and W, students do not rank universities 
that are over-demanded at positions other than the first on their preference list. 
In procedure W, there is an additional possibility for applicants to improve 
their match by strategic manipulations. The central clearinghouse (ZVS, 2006b, 
translated by the authors) advises the following strategic behavior: 
“In practice, some universities are regularly over-demanded. That is to 
say, a large number of applicants want to study at a famous university or in an 
attractive university town. Many applicants therefore state one of these 
universities as their first preference even though this university is not the nearest 
                                                
8 Note that years of study are not accepted as waiting time. Lower-ranked criteria used to break 
ties at the selection stage are average grade, completion of military or civil service, and a lottery. 
9 Students are priority ordered in the following way: (i) severely disabled applicants, (ii) applicants 
with a spouse/child having their main residence close to the university, (iii) applicants with 
particularly mandatory links to the university town, (iv) applicants registered at their parents’/ 
foster parents’ house and who want to study at the closest university, and (v) other applicants. 
Average grade and (subordinately) lotteries are used to break ties within each group. 
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one offering the desired subject; in this case these applicants are of priority order 
5 for universities which are far away. This means that a large number of 
applicants living with their own family or with their parents and having stated the 
nearest university will be considered with priority. Most applicants have little 
chance to be admitted outside their catchment area.” 
In procedure A, there is no such incentive as the final grade from school is 
used to break ties. The following hypothesis will therefore be tested empirically: 
Hypothesis 2: The percentage of applications to the closest university is 
higher in procedure W than in procedure A since in W the proximity of the 
university to the parents’ home is one of the tie-breaking criteria. 
Such manipulation of preference lists in procedure W can lead to 
inefficient outcomes (see Example 2 in the appendix).  
3.3 Procedure U 
Universities are given the opportunity to select the majority of their students 
themselves in procedure U, with the final grade from school as the predominant, 
but not the only, criterion. Procedure U is a two-stage procedure if a university 
decides to pre-select its applicants before the admission process (i.e., this pre-
selection stage is optional).10 We focus here on the admission process only 
because our data set does not provide sufficient information to study the pre-
selection process empirically. 
At the admission stage, each university ranks the (possibly) pre-selected 
applicants who have listed it using the final grade from school as the main 
criterion.11 Unlike in procedures A and W, this is a two-sided market where both 
students and universities have preferences over their match and possibly act 
strategically. Given the preference lists of universities and students, the central 
clearinghouse applies the college-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm on the set of 
pre-selected applicants. The algorithm was first described by Gale and Shapley 
(1962) although similar ideas had been in use since the 1950s in the U.S. 
                                                
10 Pre-selection can be delegated to the clearinghouse which then shortlists applicants according to 
the preference rank the applicant has given to the university and the average grade in the Abitur. 
The pre-selection criteria applied by the universities differ, requiring for example that the 
university be listed as a first preference or first to third preference. Some universities use a 
combination of average final grade and preference rank, e.g., only applicants who are among the 
best 300 applicants listing the university first or second are pre-selected. 
11 Additional admission criteria used by the universities are the weighted average of grades from 
school which reflect necessary qualifications for the subject, the result in a subject specific 
scholastic aptitude test, and an apprenticeship in an area related to the subject. 
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clearinghouse for the first jobs of doctors (see Roth, 2008).12 The college-
proposing Gale Shapley mechanism works as follows: 
Step 1: Each university i with capacity ni offers a seat to the ni applicants it 
ranks highest. Each applicant tentatively accepts the offer from the university she 
ranks highest and rejects all remaining offers. 
Step k: Each university that was rejected at step k-1 by x applicants 
proposes to its most preferred next choices, with the number of new offers (x) 
being equal to the number of rejections in the previous round. Each applicant 
considers the university it has been holding an offer from together with her new 
offers and tentatively accepts the university she ranks highest and rejects all 
others. 
The algorithm terminates when no proposal by a university is rejected. 
Each university and applicant is assigned according to the last tentative 
assignment. If for a certain seat a university is rejected by all applicants to which 
it has made an offer and there is no applicant left on its preference list, this seat 
remains unfilled.  
The Gale-Shapley college-proposing algorithm in the college admissions 
problem leads to a stable matching: Everybody prefers their match over no match 
at all and there is no student and university who are not matched but who would 
both prefer to be. In addition, the mechanism leads to the stable matching that the 
universities prefer to all other stable matchings. However, the college-proposing 
Gale-Shapley mechanism is not strategy-proof for the applicants (Roth 1985).  
3.4 Relationship between the Procedures 
The three procedures are implemented sequentially. First, procedure A is 
administered. Once applicants are admitted or rejected, procedure W is 
implemented for those applicants who are still unassigned. Finally, those 
candidates who have not been admitted either through procedure A or through 
procedure W participate in procedure U. Figure 1 illustrates the sequential 
ordering of the three procedures. As described above, open seats may remain in 
procedure A if not all selected applicants can be admitted to one of their preferred 
universities. These remaining seats, denoted by x in the figure, are moved to 
procedure W.13 
                                                
12 See Gale and Shapley (1962), Roth (1985) as well as Roth and Sotomayor (1990). For the 
related student placement problem where the priority at schools is determined by, e.g., exam 
scores see Roth (1982), Alcalde and Barberà (1994) as well as Balinski and Sönmez (1999). 
13 This feature has recently been changed. Open seats are now moved from procedure A to U.  
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Figure 1: Admission procedures – sequential order and fraction of seats allocated 
  
Since procedures are not independent from each other, applicants not only 
have to consider strategic choices within a procedure but also between procedures. 
This problem is especially severe for applicants with a very good average grade 
from school, since they have a chance to be admitted both in procedure A and U. 
These students should avoid being matched to a less preferred university in 
procedure A as they have a very good chance to be admitted to one of their top 
choices in procedure U. This leads to  
Hypothesis 3: Applicants selected in procedure A submit shorter rank-
order lists of universities than (selected) applicants in procedures W and U 
because they know that they have a good chance to receive one of their most 
preferred universities in procedure U. 
The truncation of lists in A can increase the efficiency of the mechanism 
and avoid an unstable matching. If a top student does not truncate his list but 
instead gets matched to his second choice in A, it is possible that his first-ranked 
university would prefer to be matched with him instead of being matched with 
some other student it has admitted in procedure U. Therefore, the matching is 
unstable.  
In the information brochure, the central clearinghouse does not mention 
the possibility of such truncations. However, it provides comprehensive 
information about admissions in the previous year, which in principle enables 
applicants to calculate their chances of being admitted to a certain university in U.  
Note that the incentive to list only universities that are not over-demanded 
at rank two and lower can be overruled by the incentive to truncate one’s list in A. 
In other words, listing one’s true preferences with many over-demanded 
W 
x1st stage: selection 
2nd stage: admission, (20+x)%
1st stage: selection, 20% 
x2nd stage: admission 
A 
1st stage: pre-selection, 60% 
2nd stage: selection and admission, 60%
U 
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universities in procedure A can have the same effect as a truncation and can 
therefore turn out to produce a better match for the applicants than a strategic re-
ordering of universities in A. We can compare the relative success of both 
strategies with the help of the simulations reported in Section 6.14 
4 Description of the Data 
We use the information collected through our access to the anonymized database 
of the central clearinghouse covering all applications for the winter term 2006/07. 
The following six subjects are centrally administered and are part of our data set: 
biology, medicine, pharmacy, psychology, animal health, and dentistry. The data 
set records all information provided by the applicants including data on individual 
characteristics such as age, sex, and place of living. Applicants also report their 
final average grade from school, their waiting time since completing secondary 
school, information on military or social services, and other social criteria relevant 
for the selection process. Furthermore, the database provides information on the 
admission procedures a prospective student has participated in as well as his or 
her preferences concerning the subject and the place of study that have been stated 
for the different procedures. However, for procedure U the data set only contains 
information on the choices of relatively few applicants at the pre-selection stage. 
In addition, for procedure U we only know the rank of a university in an 
applicant’s list if the applicant has been pre-selected for this university. These 
data deficiencies led us to disregard strategic behavior at the pre-selection stage in 
procedure U.  
For each of the three admission procedures, success or failure of the 
application is reported. Applicants who have been selected in the first stage of the 
selection procedure (but were not necessarily admitted) can be identified by 
applying the selection criteria made public by the central clearinghouse (ZVS 
2006c).  
                                                
14 Choices in A can, in principle, also be affected by the pre-selection criteria in U. As an example, 
suppose a top student has two favorite universities (with a slight preference for one of the two), 
and suppose she must list both universities first in procedure U in order to be pre-selected. Thus, 
she only has a chance of being pre-selected at one of the two universities in procedure U and might 
therefore consider listing both universities in procedure A. In contrast, without the pre-selection 
criteria of the two universities in U, it could be better for her to truncate her list in A to her most 
preferred university and hope to be admitted to one of her two favorite places in U. The ensuing 
hypothesis regarding longer lists in A, given that one’s most preferred universities have strict and 
exclusive pre-selection criteria in U, could be tested empirically. But the relatively small number 
of cases renders an investigation of this hypothesis futile in our data set. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics, by admission procedure 
 Procedure A Procedure W Procedure U 
 Selected Not selected Selected Not selected Accepted Rejected 
Personal characteristics 
Age (Years) 20.209 21.274 25.864 20.910 20.204 21.704 
Female 
(fraction) 
.724 .672 .614 .674 .707 .659 
Grade 1.198 2.330 2.606 2.292 1.802 2.472 
Waiting time 
(semester) 
.673 2.210 9.035 1.649 .735 2.817 
Subject preferences (fraction) 
Biology .137 .078 .176 .065 .193 .032 
Medicine .441 .499 .412 .511 .376 .549 
Pharmacy .094 .057 .095 .053 .097 .044  
Psychology .192 .202 .20 .198 .207 .197 
Animal Health .057 .080 .047 .085 .054 .090 
Dentistry .079 .084 .066 .088 .072 .090 
N 3,274 58,043 6,024 54,911 17,470 45,288 
After excluding from the data set those applicants who did not finish 
secondary school in Germany, we are left with a total number of 65,254 
observations.15 Almost every applicant has submitted a preference list for each of 
the three procedures. In fact, 61,317 prospective students have chosen to take part 
in procedure A, 60,935 in procedure W, and 62,758 have supplied a preference 
list for procedure U. For each application procedure, the descriptive statistics in 
Table 1 contrast the characteristics of those applicants that have been selected at 
the first stage with those of the unsuccessful candidates.16  
The table illustrates the different selection criteria applied in the three 
procedures. Applicants selected in procedure A have received extraordinarily 
good final grades in school. While candidates successful in procedure U 
performed somewhat worse, they still outperform the rejected applicants by their 
good final grades. Students selected in procedure W, in contrast, are characterized 
by a relatively poor performance in school, but they have been waiting for a seat 
at a university for a long time. The table also shows that the largest share of 
applicants are potential medical students, and that subject preferences matter for 
the success probability of an application. 
                                                
15 In Section 5.2 we make use of the fact that in procedure W the proximity of an applicant’s place 
of living to the preferred university is used as a (subordinated) admission criterion which may 
induce strategic behavior. Since this criterion is never fulfilled by students living abroad, we have 
restricted the data set as described. 
16 Since the pre-selection step is not obligatory for universities in procedure U, only the 
characteristics of accepted and rejected students are compared for this procedure. 
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5 Empirical Evidence of Strategic Behavior 
As a first step towards evaluating the performance of the assignment mechanism, 
we compare stated preferences and slots received by the selected candidates. In 
Table 2, we simply count the number of times where the first preference of an 
applicant is satisfied, the number of times the second preference is satisfied, and 
so on. In procedure A, 58.3% of the selected students are admitted to their first 
preference. In procedure W, this percentage is similar at 61.8%. Notice that the 
second to sixth preference are only rarely satisfied in both procedures. This is a 
direct effect of the Boston algorithm in procedures A and W, which gives priority 
to those students who have listed a university as their first choice.  
However, stated and true preferences may not coincide. Therefore, the 
fraction of students who are assigned to their first choice cannot be taken as a 
measure of success. In what follows, we investigate to what extent behavior 
observed in the data is consistent with the incentive to act strategically. The main 
difficulty for studying strategic behavior empirically is the unobservability of the 
applicants’ true preferences. Testing the three hypotheses developed in Section 0 
provides us with indirect evidence on the question of whether students reveal their 
preferences truthfully or whether they behave strategically. In Section 6, we will 
then infer the true preferences from the lists submitted by each applicant. This 
allows us to compare the efficiency and stability of the current mechanism with 
alternative mechanisms. We will thereby be able to evaluate the quantitative 
importance of the strategic responses for overall efficiency. 
Table 2: Preference received by applicants fulfilling selection criteria  
 Procedure A Procedure W 
Number Per cent Number Per cent 
1st preference 1,909 58.33 3,723 61.80 
2nd preference 214 6.54 395 6.56 
3rd preference 80 2.44 198 3.24 
4th preference 54 1.65 114 1.89 
5th preference 57 1.74 104 1.73 
6th preference 27 0.82 61 1.01 
Other preference - - 447 7.42 
Unassigned 933 28.48 982 16.30 
 3,274 100.0 6,024 100.0 
5.1 Strategic Preference Ordering Within Procedures 
First, we test Hypothesis 1 stating that under the Boston mechanism it is 
suboptimal to state an over-demanded university at any preference rank other than 
the first. For the empirical analysis, we have created a dummy for each stated 
14
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 10 [2010], Iss. 1 (Advances), Art. 22
Bereitgestellt von | Technische Universität Berlin
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 01.10.18 11:53
preference indicating whether or not the university listed was over-demanded for 
the chosen subject within the procedure considered in the previous year. This 
information is publicly available from the central clearinghouse (ZVS 2006c), and 
applicants can be expected to be familiar with this information prior to their 
choice. 
Table 3 presents the percentage of over-demanded universities at each 
rank of the preference list for procedures A and W.17 The table reveals that both 
among all and among selected applicants in procedures A and W, the fraction of 
over-demanded universities is largest in the first preference stated.18 The fraction 
clearly drops from the first to the second preference, for example, by 7.2 
percentage points among selected applicants in procedure A and by 8.4 percentage 
points among selected applicants in procedure W. The differences between 
adjacent preference ranks further down the list are usually much smaller than the 
drop observed between the first and the second preference.19 This is consistent 
with a number of students understanding that they should never rank over-
demanded universities at the second to sixth place.  
                                                
17 If this table is constructed only for those applicants who have listed 6 universities, the same 
qualitative pattern emerges. 
18 Also note that selected applicants choose over-demanded universities more often than all 
applicants together. This effect is particularly strong in procedure A with 53.7% of all applicants 
and 68.2% of the selected applicants ranking an over-demanded university first. If the selected 
applicants are a random sample with regard to their preferences, then this hints at strategic 
considerations of the applicants who submit a list of preferences that depends on their own grade 
in procedure A. 
19 This observation also rules out that the observed drop simply results from the fact that once an 
over-demanded university is chosen at the first preference rank, the pool of over-demanded 
universities shrinks and, hence, the likelihood of choosing an over-demanded university at the 
second rank decreases as well. In particular, similar drops should then also be evident for ranks 
further down the list. Importantly, the pool of over-demanded universities is quite large. In fact, at 
about 41.0% (58.3%) of all university-subject combinations are over-demanded in procedure A 
(W). Hence, even after choosing an over-demanded university the applicant is left with a 
considerable number of potential choices that are over-demanded as well. 
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Table 3: Fraction of universities over-demanded in the previous year in stated 
preferences 
 Procedure A Procedure W 
 All applicants Selected 
applicants 
All applicants Selected 
applicants 
All applicants
1st preference .537 .682 .617 .654 
2nd preference .479 .610 .555 .570 
3rd preference .453 .593 .537 .538 
4th preference .456 .552 .531 .526 
5th preference .433 .497 .505 .507 
6th preference .414 .501 .495 .501 
An alternative approach to the question of how often over-demanded 
universities are ranked first, second or lower is to take every subject-university 
combination as a unit of observation. In order to detect strategic preference 
orderings of the applicants we run the following regression: 
β β β β ε−− = + + + ++ 0 1 ( 1) 2 3
ijkt ijlt





with t = 2006. This allows us to test the theoretical prediction that over-demanded 
university-subject combinations are more likely to experience a drop between the 
numbers of applications ranking it first and second. As the dependent variable at 
time t, we take the difference between the number of applications ranking 
university i for subject j at positions k and l normalized by the total number of 
applications at the two adjacent ranks. Accordingly, the variable to be explained is 
bounded by ± 1 and takes a value of 0 in case of a balanced number of 
applications at the two ranks considered. The normalization ensures that the 
dependent variable is not influenced by the size of a university. Otherwise, we 
would risk biased estimates given that the probability of a university being over-
demanded may be related to its size. 
The dependent variable is regressed on the dummy OverDemandedij(t-1)
indicating whether or not subject j has been over-demanded at university i in the 
previous year.20 As further explanatory variables we include the (yearly) 
                                                
20 By using information from the previous rather than from the current year, we not only capture 
much better the information available to applicants but we also avoid potential endogeneity biases. 
If we had instead relied on information from the current year, an observed drop between the 
number of applications ranking a university first and second would not necessarily have implied 
strategic behavior but might have simply hinted at a large number of applications ranking the 
university at position one, which, by definition, causes the university to be over-demanded. When 
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population growth of the city a university is located in (PopGrowthit) and a 
dummy indicating a population size of above 500,000 inhabitants (Cityit) at time t. 
Both variables are meant to proxy the attractiveness of the city environment, 
which is likely to influence applicants’ behavior. Furthermore, a full set of subject 
dummies is included.  
The results of OLS estimations for both procedures, A and W, are 
presented in Table 4. As expected, the estimated coefficient of the dummy for 
being over-demanded is positive and highly statistically significant in the 
regression on the difference between ranks 1 and 2. This applies to both 
application procedures but not to ranks further down the preference list.21
Therefore, the difference between the number of applications ranking a 
university-subject combination first and second is significantly higher for over-
demanded combinations. This is consistent with a significant proportion of 
students understanding that they can list an over-demanded university-subject 
combination first, but that they should not list it at any other preference rank. 
The question arises why there are still so many students who rank over-
demanded universities at ranks 2 to 6. Of course, many applicants may not 
understand the strategic incentives. In addition, the data show that only around 
72% (procedure A) or 81% (procedure W) of the universities that were over-
demanded in 2006/07 were also over-demanded in 2005/06. Thus, some 
applicants may speculate that a university which was over-demanded in the 
previous year might not be over-demanded in the current year and therefore list it 
at a lower rank. Finally, and as discussed in more detail in Section 3.4, the 
incentive to list only universities that are not over-demanded at rank two and 
lower can be overruled if the applicant has a good chance of obtaining her 
preferred choices in procedure U. 
                                                
basing the classification of university-subject combinations as over-demanded on the number of 
applications from the previous year, there is no such issue of reverse causation. 
21 The dummy is also significant at the 10%-level in the regression on the difference between 
ranks 3 and 4 in procedure W. However, the coefficient is comparably small and no such effect is 
found for procedure A. 
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Table 4: Preference discontinuities – Regression results 
 Dependent Variable: 
 (Prefijkt - Prefijlt) / (Prefijkt + Prefijlt) 
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Subject Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R² .1471 .0677 .0162 .0311 .0217 
N 144 144 144 144 139 
***, **, *: statistically significant at the 1, 5, 10 percent level. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. 
Prefijkt: Number of Applications Ranking University i for subject j at position k at time t. 
City dummy indicates a population size of above 500,000 inhabitants at time t. 
Population growth gives the (yearly) population growth of the city a university is located (at time t). 
5.2 Stability of Preferences across Procedures 
If applicants revealed their preferences truthfully, stated preferences should not 
vary across the three procedures. However, the criteria employed to admit 
applicants differ between the procedures, and it can therefore be rational for an 
applicant to submit different preference lists.  
Table 5 reports the discrepancies between the lists applicants submit in the 
three procedures A, W, and U. Discrepancies at a certain preference rank can 
result either from naming different universities or from not stating a preference in 
one list, but stating one in the other list. Even when restricting attention to the first 
case, the results in Table 5 show that a considerable number of subjects submit 
different lists. This holds for all three comparisons between the procedures at all 
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preference ranks, displaying between 13% and 30% different choices. Using a 
one-sided t-test we find that these differences are significantly larger than zero at 
all conventional levels. 
Table 5: Fraction of applicants naming a different university at a certain 
preference rank (without truncations) 
 Procedures 
A vs. W A vs. U W vs. U 
1st preference 0.135 0.188 0.221 
2nd preference 0.184 0.254 0.289 
3rd preference 0.202 0.271 0.306 
4th preference 0.208 0.267 0.303 
5th preference 0.200 0.252 0.285 
6th preference 0.184 0.218 0.254 
We now take a closer look at the question of whether different selection 
criteria lead to the observed differences in the preference lists. Given our data set, 
this can best be seen when comparing procedures A and W. Quantitatively the 
most important subordinated criterion for admission in procedure W is whether a 
student who lives with his parents applies to the closest university. While this 
information is not provided directly in the data set, we can identify the university 
closest to an applicant’s place of living. We then compare the fraction of 
applicants in the two procedures that list their closest university. By doing so, we 
can test Hypothesis 2 according to which the percentage of applications to the 
closest university is higher in procedure W than in procedure A. 
Table 6: Fraction of applicants with preference for closest university 
1st preference 2nd preference 3rd preference 
Procedure A
All applicants .521 .167 .085 
Selected applicants .499 .148 .089 
Procedure W 
All applicants .533 .171 .086 
Selected applicants .653 .190 .082 
Hypothesis 2 is clearly supported by the data as can be taken from Table 6. 
The effect is relatively small for all applicants. Nevertheless, a two-sample test of 
proportion reveals that the fraction of applicants listing their closest university 
first, second or third is significantly higher for procedure W than for A on all 
conventional significance levels. The difference increases considerably when only 
selected applicants are considered. Since selected applicants have a realistic 
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chance of being assigned in the respective procedure, A or W, they have a strong 
motive to optimize their preference orderings and thus behave strategically.22 
5.3 Truncated Preference Lists 
A considerable number of students remain unassigned in procedures A and W, 
even though they fulfill the selection criteria. The number is particularly high in 
procedure A where more than one-quarter of the selected students are not 
admitted to any university. This observation is in line with the incentive to go for 
the top choice(s) in procedure A and, in case of no success, hope to be admitted in 
procedure U (as formulated in Hypothesis 3).  
In fact, 99% of the selected students who remained unassigned in 
procedure A obtained a seat at a university; the overwhelming majority even 
obtained their top choice in procedure U. To take a closer look at the applicants’ 
behavior, Table 7 displays the percentage of students who list only one university, 
only two universities, etc. in procedures A and W. 
Table 7: Number of universities ranked by applicants 
 Procedure A Procedure W 
Number of universities 
ranked All applicants 
Selected 
applicants All applicants 
Selected 
applicants 
1 .111 .261 .089 .172 
2 .061 .097 .041 .065 
3 .075 .118 .043 .059 
4 .055 .080 .026 .032 
5 .096 .081 .082 .051 
6 .602 .364 .720 .621 
N 61,317 3,274 60,935 6,024 
Almost all students supply a rank-order list for procedures A and W even 
if their chances of being selected are virtually zero. The second and fourth 
columns of Table 7 show that the majority of all students submit a list of six 
universities, but that significantly more students truncate their preference lists in 
procedure A than in procedure W. The difference widens considerably when we 
look at selected students only. In procedure A (third column) more than a quarter 
                                                
22 One potential problem of the analysis is that applicants selected in the two procedures may 
systematically differ from each other with respect to their inclination to move away from their 
home town. Since the two groups of selected students in procedures A and W are almost 
disjointed, we cannot tackle the problem by analyzing the behavior of candidates selected in both 
procedures. Instead, we checked (and confirmed) the robustness of our results by means of a 
regression analysis controlling for observable characteristics that should arguably be correlated 
with individual mobility. Detailed regression results can be obtained from the authors upon 
request. 
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of the selected students only list one university and only 36% list six universities. 
In contrast, 62% of the applicants selected in W name six universities on their 
rank-order list.23 In procedure W, no analogous incentive to truncate the list exists 
because the successfully selected students in procedure W usually have such poor 
grades that they have no chance of being admitted through procedure U. A two-
sample test of proportion reveals that for both, all applicants and selected 
applicants, the difference between A and W is statistically significant at any 
conventional level. 
Table 7 also reveals that many selected applicants do not submit truncated 
lists in procedure A. They could either be risk-averse or indifferent among a 
number of universities. In addition, the strategic incentives are probably not clear 
to all applicants.24 We will come back to the effect of such choices on the 
matching outcome in Section 6. 
Table 8: Fraction of applicants submitting truncated preference lists, by grade  
Grade Procedure A 
1.0 - 1.2 .602 
1.3 - 1.5 .496 
1.6 – 1.8 .406 
1.9 – 2.1 .319 
≥ 2.2 .390 
As we have seen, selected applicants tend to truncate their submitted 
preference lists more often in procedure A than in procedure W. This is in line 
with Hypothesis 3. We even expect that the incentives to truncate vary by grade in 
procedure A, since excellent applicants can be confident of getting a seat in 
procedure U. Weaker candidates, in contrast, may be less certain about their 
chances in the final procedure and therefore less inclined to play a (potentially 
risky) truncation strategy earlier on. In accordance with this hypothesis, Table 8 
provides clear evidence that the fraction of truncated preference lists is increasing 
with school performance in procedure A. 
Another test of truncations can be provided by only considering applicants 
who have been selected in procedure A and by comparing the length of their lists 
in procedure A and in procedure U. We find that in this group, the percentage of 
                                                
23 The still surprisingly large number of selected applicants in W who truncate their list may be 
explained by the fact that these applicants have been waiting a number of years to be admitted and 
might therefore have stronger obligations and preferences for living in a certain place than students 
with shorter waiting times. 
24 For example, the experimental study by Chen and Sönmez (2006) shows that about 20% of the 
participants use the suboptimal strategy of telling the truth under the Boston mechanism. 
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applicants listing only one university in procedure A is more than 10 percentage 
points higher than in procedure U.25  
The choice to rank only one’s first preference(s) in procedure A has two 
important side effects. First, around 28% of the slots the universities planned to 
fill through procedure A were not taken in procedure A because some universities 
were not listed often enough by applicants. And in 2006/07, the unfilled slots 
from procedure A were moved to procedure W. Thus, some universities received 
far more than 20% of their students through procedure W.26 Since 2007 unfilled 
seats have been moved to procedure U instead. In this way, universities are able to 
admit students from the same pool as in procedure A, namely students with very 
good final grades.  
The second effect of truncation strategies is that they can prevent 
inefficient and unstable matchings. Applicants who truncate their lists in 
procedure A avoid being matched to a university at a low preference rank in A 
although they would be admitted to a higher ranked university in procedure U. 
From this perspective, truncation strategies are necessary to correct deficiencies of 
the mechanism. In the next section, we will study the effect of truncations on the 
matching outcome with the help of simulations. 
6 Efficiency and Stability: Evidence from Simulations 
There is still one vital question to be addressed, namely whether the mechanism 
leads to an efficient matching. The unique property of the data set is that 
applicants submit three different lists and through this information we can infer 
the applicants’ true preferences. Thus, we can evaluate the efficiency of the 
current mechanism and compare it to the efficiency of alternative mechanisms.  
Before we present the results of our simulations, a number of remarks are 
in order. First, we restrict attention to procedures A and U because procedure W 
concerns only a disjointed set of applicants with poor grades and low chances of 
being admitted through the other two procedures. Thus, interesting interactions 
occur mainly between procedures A and U. In addition, applicants probably do 
not think very hard when filling out lists in procedures that are not relevant for 
them. This makes the lists submitted for procedures A and U by students with 
                                                
25 This difference is statistically significant at any conventional level. Notice that we might even 
underestimate the truncation effect since our data only contain lists for procedure U that have 
already been shortened due to the removal of universities for which an applicant has not been pre-
selected. Detailed results can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
26 The number of students selected in procedure W is almost twice as large as the number of 
students selected in procedure A, as displayed in Table 7. This is due to the unfilled slots from 
procedure A which were moved to procedure W, but also to the fact that the clearinghouse 
“overbooks” seats in procedure W but not in procedure A to account for applicants not accepting 
an offer. 
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long waiting times and poorer grades less informative. We will therefore focus 
mainly on the selected applicants (as in the previous section) and on those 
applicants that have good chances of being admitted both in procedures A and U. 
Second, in order to approximate the preferences of universities in 
procedure U, of which we lack the data, we take the final grade from school as the 
criterion by which universities rank students. As all universities have to use this 
grade as the main criterion (due to legal constraints) and some universities even 
base their ranking of applicants solely on the final grade, this approach seems 
justified.  
Finally, we infer the applicants’ true preferences from the rank-order lists 
submitted in procedure U which are possibly complemented by the lists submitted 
in A. The preferences submitted for procedure U should correspond to the 
(possibly incomplete) true preferences of the applicants for two reasons. First, in 
the college-proposing Gale-Shapley mechanism all successful manipulations can 
also be accomplished by truncations. Or, in other words, “every applicant who can 
do better than to submit his true preferences as his ROL [rank-order list] can do so 
by submitting a truncation of his true preferences.” (See Roth and Peranson, 1999, 
p. 762, referring to results by Roth and Vande Vate, 1991.) Thus, even if 
applicants strategically truncate their lists submitted in U, the correct rank order of 
the remaining choices is preserved. And since truncations are the manipulations 
that require the least information about others’ preferences, they are more likely to 
occur than other manipulations (see Roth and Rothblum, 1999).  
Second, if preferences of universities are perfectly correlated (which they 
are if universities rank applicants only by their final grades from school), then 
there is only one stable matching.27 And if there is only one stable matching, it is 
achieved by both the college- and the student-proposing Gale-Shapley 
mechanism. Since the latter is strategy-proof (see Roth, 1982), it then follows that 
truth-telling is also a dominant strategy in the college-proposing Gale-Shapley 
mechanism. Thus, we can conclude that the incentives to misrepresent one’s 
preferences in procedure U are null for perfectly correlated preferences and they 
are very small if the preferences of universities are strongly correlated, as is the 
case in the German university admission system. 
Therefore, we will take the lists submitted in procedure U as the true lists 
if they are not truncated. If they are truncated, this may be due to either strategic 
truncations or to the pre-selection procedure. To partly correct for “involuntary” 
truncations at the pre-selection stage, we proceed as follows. When an applicant 
has ranked a university first in procedure A that does not appear on the list in 
procedure U, we put this university first on the list for the true preferences (and 
                                                
27 To see this, note that in any stable matching the student ranked highest by the universities gets 
his preferred matching. Thus, there is only one stable matching for the student with the best final 
grade. This argument can be repeated for all other students. 
23
Braun et al.: Telling the Truth May Not Pay Off
Bereitgestellt von | Technische Universität Berlin
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 01.10.18 11:53
append the choices made in U thereafter).28 Arguably, an applicant should always 
submit her true first choice in procedure A because, if selected, she has an 
excellent final grade and therefore a very good chance to be admitted. As a 
robustness check, we also ran simulations without augmenting the preference lists 
submitted in procedure U and find our results qualitatively unchanged. 
We use the inferred true preferences to compare the matching outcome of 
the following five scenarios: 
(1) Current mechanism used by the clearinghouse with applicants submitting 
their stated preferences (as recorded in our data). 
(2) Current mechanism used by the clearinghouse with applicants submitting 
their (inferred) true preferences.  
(3) Current mechanism used by the clearinghouse with applicants submitting 
their (inferred) true preferences but truncating their lists in procedure A after 
the first choice. 
(4) Free choice of applicants selected in procedure A plus Gale-Shapley 
mechanism to distribute the remaining seats among non-selected applicants. 
(5) All seats are allocated through a single procedure using the Gale-Shapley 
mechanism. 
  
The first three scenarios are based on the mechanism that is currently used 
by the clearinghouse, and we evaluate different strategies under this mechanism. 
Scenarios (4) and (5) consider alternative mechanisms. Scenario (4) simply allows 
the selected excellent students to take up a seat at their most preferred university. 
Remaining seats are then distributed among non-selected applicants through 
procedure U. Finally, in scenario (5) we replace the existing sequential 
mechanism by a single (college- or student-proposing) Gale-Shapley algorithm. 
We start by considering only those applicants for which the above changes 
should matter the most, namely applicants who have been selected in procedure 
A. Table 9 displays the percentage of (selected) applicants receiving their first or a 
lower preference under different mechanisms. Columns two to four document the 
results for the mechanism that is currently used by the clearinghouse. Comparing 
the second and the third column shows that submitting the true instead of the 
stated preferences increases the percentage of applicants who receive their first 
choice by 0.8 percentage points.  
                                                
28 The first preference in procedure A was moved to the first position of the list submitted in A for 
3.81% of the applicants selected in procedure A and for 3.64% of all applicants. Note that we did 
not use the second and third choices in procedure A for the construction of the true preferences: 
They might already be strategic since it is suboptimal to list over-demanded universities on lower 
ranks. 
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There are two reasons for some applicants being better off when 
submitting their true preferences. First, the Boston mechanism leads to an 
efficient matching when all applicants submit their true preferences (see Ergin and 
Sönmez, 2006) and truth-telling behavior can thus avoid some inefficient matches. 
Second, over-demanded universities are listed more often on lower ranks when 
applicants submit their true preferences (see Section 5.1 where we have shown 
that a number of applicants avoid ranking over-demanded universities on lower 
ranks). This increases the probability to remain unmatched in procedure A, which 
in turn can be beneficial for an applicant who has a good chance to receive her 
first choice in procedure U. 
Table 9: Simulation results – Preferences received by applicants selected in 
procedure A (fraction), by mechanism and preferences 























1st preference .795 .803 .968 .999 .968 
2nd preference .096 .098 .022 .000 .022 
3rd preference .038 .036 .004 .000 .004 
4th preference .021 .025 .000 .000 .000 
5th preference .021 .027 .000 .000 .000 
6th preference .010 .010 .000 .000 .000 
Unassigned .019 .002 .006 .001 .006 
The preferences allocated by each mechanism are always compared to the true preferences of each applicant. 
For the mechanism “Procedure A + college-proposing Gale-Shapley mechanism” the category unassigned also contains 
those applicants who could have been matched but not to a university that is among their first six true preferences. 
The total sample consists of the 3,266 applicants who have been selected in procedure A. 
    
A much larger increase in the number of students being admitted to their 
true first choice can be observed when moving to a mechanism in which we 
truncate the applicants’ lists in procedure A after the first choice (Table 9, fourth 
column). A significant proportion of applicants selected in procedure A thus fail 
to understand that they should truncate their preference list in procedure A in 
order to avoid being matched too early to a university they rank low. Too few 
truncations then lead to unstable matchings as blocking pairs of students and 
universities exist. The number of selected applicants receiving their first choice 
would have increased by 17.3 percentage points if applicants had submitted a 
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truncated list in A containing only their first choices.29 The same percentage of 
matches to first choices is achieved with a one-step procedure consisting of a 
student- or college-proposing Gale-Shapley mechanism, reported in the last 
column of the table.30  
Not surprisingly, the highest proportion of selected applicants matched to 
their first choice is reached in a mechanism where universities do not have a fixed 
proportion of seats reserved for students selected in procedure A, but admit all 
students in procedure A who list them first (up to their capacity constraint). As the 
capacity of universities is sufficient to accept all excellent students who list the 
university first in our data set, this means that the 20% best applicants selected in 
procedure A can freely choose which university to attend. Therefore, all students 
selected in procedure A are matched to their first choice if they submit a list in 
procedure A, a result reported in the fifth column of Table 9.31 
Up to now, we have focused our comparison of the mechanisms on the 
overall proportion of applicants selected in procedure A who have received their 
first choice. But in order to evaluate the efficiency of the mechanisms, one also 
has to consider people who are negatively affected by the choice of a certain 
mechanism over another. The proportion of selected applicants who are better off 
compared to the proportion of selected applicants who are worse off is reported in 
Table 10. In square brackets, we also report the fraction of all applicants affected 
positively or negatively. 
                                                
29 Of course, our assumption that preferences of universities are perfectly correlated with grade 
might overestimate the probability of a student selected in procedure A getting a seat in procedure 
U. However, (i) rankings by universities are highly correlated with grade in reality, since by legal 
restraint universities have to put a large weight on the average grade as an admission criteria. 
Moreover, (ii) the effect of interviews and tests etc. on the rank-order list of the universities should 
be zero in expectations. 
30 The equality of the columns relating to the truncated lists and the Gale-Shapley mechanism is no 
coincidence. The first choice in procedure A is the same as the first choice in procedure U as we 
use the true preferences for the simulations of both mechanisms. The probability to be matched to 
one’s first choice in procedure A + Gale-Shapley or in Gale-Shapley alone is the same, which is 
due to the fact that in our data set a university that cannot accept all selected applicants listing it 
first in procedure A accepts them in the Gale-Shapley part. Note also that the mechanism proposed 
by Westkamp (2009) results in the same matching as the Gale-Shapley mechanism in our 
simulations because all universities rank applicants according to their final grades – and thus have 
perfectly correlated preferences. 
31 Note that the difference between the last two columns has to do with the fact that the selected 
applicants in procedure A are not necessarily those with the best grades. This is due to the quotas 
for the federal states which correct for the differences of the grade distributions across states. In 
procedure U, universities do not use such corrections but take the grade at face value. For a 
critique see Braun and Dwenger (2009). 
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Table 10: Simulation results – Fraction of applicants selected in A that are 
better/worse off by the respective re-design of the assignment 
procedure, all applicants in brackets 
Mechanism introduced: 
Procedure A + 
Gale-Shapley mechanism 


















their list in 








.077 / .061 
[.008 / .007] 
.193 / .015 
[.013 / .027] 
.205 / .000 
[.026 / .017] 
.193 / .015 
[.024 / .014] 
... true 
preferences - 
.183 / .011 
[.009 / .025] 
.197 / .000 
[.024 / .016] 
.183 / .011 
[.023 / .013] Procedure A + 
Gale-Shapley 
mechanism … true 
preferences 
but truncate 
their list in 
A after the 
first choice 
- - .032 / .000 [.027 / .004] 
.000 / .000 
[.024 / .000] 






preferences - - - 
.000 / .032 
[.009 / .008] 
An applicant is made better off by the respective re-design if she either receives a seat at a higher ranked university or 
receives a seat at any university she ranked while remaining unassigned under the alternative mechanism. 
The total sample consists of 63,674 applicants, of which 3,266 have been selected in procedure A. Values for all 
applicants are given in square brackets. 
When applicants refrain from acting strategically and submit their true 
preferences with the existing mechanism remaining in place, a fraction of 
applicants is better off whereas a fraction of almost the same size is worse off 
(with 7.7% of the selected applicants better off and 6.1% worse off; 0.8% of all 
applicants better off and 0.7% worse off).32 Several effects are at work here and 
must be considered to explain this finding. On the one hand, the Boston 
                                                
32 These numbers seem relatively small, but given that 75% of the applicants are not admitted to 
any university, the percentage of admitted students who are affected is considerable. 
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mechanism produces a Pareto efficient outcome when all applicants submit their 
true preferences. Further, we have already argued that not listing over-demanded 
universities at lower ranks is optimal within procedure A but can be counter-
productive in the overall mechanism, as it may lead to an early match that is 
inferior to what applicants could have received by moving on to procedure U. 
Applicants not stating over-demanded universities on lower ranks of their 
preference list might hence be better off with their true preferences if over-
demanded universities on lower ranks of their true preference lists prevent them 
from being matched too early. On the other hand, some applicants are harmed by 
replacing the stated by the true preferences. They truncated their lists in procedure 
A, and by submitting their true preferences (consisting of six universities), they 
are matched too early and made worse off. 
If applicants truncate their true preferences after the first university instead 
of submitting their stated preferences, the number of applicants affected increases 
notably. Almost 20% of the selected applicants benefit from the truncation 
strategy while only 1.5% lose. The truncation strategy of selected applicants goes 
at the expense of non-selected applicants, since unmatched selected applicants are 
added to the pool of prospective students competing for the (constant) number of 
seats available in procedure U (remember that seats not allocated in procedure A 
are moved to procedure W). Overall, 2.7% of all applicants are worse off while 
only 1.3% benefit. These results are qualitatively unchanged when we compare 
the truncation strategy to the scenario where applicants submit their true 
preferences.  
Allowing all applicants selected in procedure A to pick their most 
preferred university clearly benefits all selected applicants and harms none of 
them. For the non-selected students, some are better off and some worse, due to 
the changed set of seats allocated in procedure A and the changed set of students 
participating in procedure U. Since in contrast to the existing mechanism no seats 
are moved to procedure W, the number of beneficiaries of the redesign outnumber 
the losers not only among selected but also among all applicants.  
Finally, selected students could also be made better off on average by 
replacing the existing mechanism by a simple one-stage procedure with seats 
being allocated through the Gale-Shapley mechanism of procedure U alone. The 
fraction of all applicants that are better off under such a re-design of the 
mechanism again exceeds the number of those who are worse off. Compared to 
the “truncation scenario” both proposals for a re-design of the existing mechanism 
(i.e., scenarios (4) and (5)) have the advantage that no seats are “lost” to 
procedure W. 
Regarding stability of the matchings from the simulations, some 
straightforward conclusions can be drawn. Due to the perfectly correlated 
preferences of universities, the one-step Gale-Shapley mechanism produces the 
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unique stable matching. All other matchings must therefore be unstable. We have 
already discussed that in the current mechanism, an unstable matching results 
because many excellent students do not truncate their lists in procedure A. But 
even if all students played a truncation strategy or the mechanism was re-designed 
along the lines of scenario (4), the resulting matching would not be stable.  
The simulations shed new light on the findings of the empirical tests 
reported in the previous section. In particular, we can quantify the effects of 
strategic choices in procedure A with respect to over-demanded universities and 
truncations (Hypotheses 1 and 3). It emerges that strategic re-orderings of the lists 
submitted in procedure A benefit some applicants at the expense of others. Most 
importantly, we show that far too few applicants truncate their lists in procedure 
A. As a consequence, procedure A – which is designed to give excellent 
applicants a better chance than others to be admitted to their preferred university – 
has exactly the opposite effect. Removing procedure A altogether, or softening the 
quotas in A so that all excellent applicants can be admitted to their first choice, 
clearly improves the outcome for them.  
7 Policy Implications: Changing the Mechanism? 
Building on the results reported in the previous two sections, we now briefly 
discuss ways to re-organize the market for university admissions in Germany. 
We have shown that the sequential structure of the three procedures and 
the use of the Boston mechanism create incentives for strategic behavior, which 
can be tracked in the data. A mechanism where the quotas for excellent applicants 
are relaxed, i.e., where all selected applicants get their first choice, makes many 
applicants better off than before, but it also makes a number of other applicants 
worse off. Thus, there is no Pareto improvement. Nevertheless, a change in the 
mechanism might still be considered, especially if excellent applicants are to be 
given an advantage in the admissions process. An even simpler way to reform the 
current mechanism is to drop procedure A and move all its seats to procedure U.33 
The simulations show that this has almost the same positive effect on top-grade 
applicants as giving them the free choice of a university while harming fewer of 
the other applicants.  
In the simulations, we made the simplifying assumption that all 
universities have the same preferences over applicants. Therefore, the college-
proposing and the student-proposing Gale-Shapley mechanism lead to the same 
                                                
33 This has also been suggested by the Wissenschaftsrat (the German Council of Science and 
Humanities, 2004) in a statement highlighting the important role of the final grade as a predictor of 
academic success. After mentioning the possibility of allocating a number of slots directly to those 
with the best final grades (as in procedure A), it is explicitly mentioned that a combined procedure 
where the final grade plays a dominant role might be especially effective (p. 48).   
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matching. But this is not the case in general as preferences of universities are not 
perfectly correlated. Thus, students can improve their matching by submitting 
strategic rank-order lists in procedure U. We therefore propose replacing the 
college-proposing Gale-Shapley and the Boston mechanism with the student-
proposing mechanism, for which truth-telling is the dominant strategy of 
applicants.  
Strategy proofness has the advantage that the amount of information 
applicants have does not matter for the matching outcome. Thereby, the student-
proposing matching algorithm levels the playing field for all applicants. This has 
already been shown in computational experiments by Roth and Peranson (1999), 
who analyzed the effects of switching from a program-proposing to an applicant-
proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm in the context of the national match for doctors 
in the U.S.34  
Importantly, the sequential application of several matching algorithms 
affects and complicates their strategic properties. A one-stage procedure is 
therefore preferable. But how can the student-proposing Gale-Shapley mechanism 
be adapted to the requirement that quotas for excellent students and for students 
with long waiting times should be met? The Gale-Shapley mechanism requires a 
consolidated preference list of all participants on both sides of the market. This is 
simple for the applicants. If strategic behavior does not pay out, applicants do not 
suffer from having to submit one single list containing their true preferences 
(instead of three lists as in the current mechanism). A single preference ordering 
for every university, however, is more difficult to realize as the quotas for 
excellent students and for students with long waiting times must be 
accommodated. 
Westkamp (2009) has developed a mechanism for centralized university 
admissions that is based on the student-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm, 
but which allows for the quotas of the present system. This mechanism has several 
desirable properties such as being strategy-proof for the students and stable.   
Alternatively, the Gale-Shapley mechanism can be adjusted to affirmative 
action rules in the college admissions problem or, equivalently, to controlled 
choice in the school choice problem (see Abdulkadiroglu, 2005; Abdulkadiroglu 
and Sönmez, 2003). With affirmative action rules, students have to be divided into 
different types with each student belonging to only one of the types. Each 
university may have its own quotas, or there can be a quota that applies to all 
universities. It is then assumed that each university prefers a set of students that 
                                                
34 The effects found by Roth and Peranson (1999) are small both for applicants and programs due 
to the limited number of interviews of each applicant and program and the resulting small set of 
stable matchings. Although German universities rank students whom they have not interviewed, 
the set of stable matchings may nevertheless be small due to a strong correlation of the 
universities’ preferences. 
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satisfies the quota to a set of students that does not satisfy the quota. Again, this 
mechanism is strategy-proof for the students and stable if preferences of 
universities satisfy certain regularity conditions. 
8 Concluding Remarks 
We have provided an empirical analysis of the centralized university admission 
procedure for medicine and related subjects in Germany. The mechanism, which 
consists of three procedures that are applied sequentially, is not strategy-proof and 
applicants have an incentive to misrepresent their preferences. Using a 
comprehensive data set, we have evidence that some, but not all, students 
understand the mechanism perfectly well and therefore behave strategically when 
submitting their preference lists.  
Simulations allow us to evaluate the effects of the applicants’ choices on 
the efficiency and stability of the matching and to investigate alternative 
mechanisms. As many excellent applicants fail to understand the strategic 
properties of the mechanism, the very procedure that is designed to help them 
actually lowers their success probabilities. To benefit the excellent applicants, all 
it would take are some simple changes to the current mechanism.  
Our paper not only studies aspects of the current German system, but also 
makes a methodological contribution. Based on data from a centralized university 
admissions system, testable hypotheses are developed to assess the functioning of 
the matching mechanism. Given that the clearinghouse employs the college-
proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm in an environment with highly correlated 
preferences of universities, we can approximate an applicant’s true rank-order list 
and study the efficiency and stability of various mechanisms. In light of the 
growing importance of school choice and competition between universities, 
empirical investigations of such markets are an important instrument for 
evaluating their functioning.  
Appendix 
Example 1  
Assume that there are four universities U={u1,u2,u3,u4} where n={1,1,2,1} is the 
respective number of available seats. Every university u gives priority to 
applicants who rank university u higher over applicants ranking it lower. 
Furthermore, universities use grade averages to break the ties among students who 
have given it the same rank. The set of selected applicants consists of 
A={a1,a2,a3,a4,a5} and their respective average grades are denoted by g. To 
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simplify, let us assume that students are allowed to rank no more than three 
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Step 1: In step 1 only the first preference of the applicants is considered. 
Applicant a2 is assigned to university u1. Applicant a1 receives an offer from 
university u2. Applicants a3, a4 and a5 cannot be admitted in the first step. 
Step 2: As applicants a3, a4 and a5 are still unassigned, their second 
preference is considered. While applicant a4 can be admitted to university u3, 
applicants a3 and a5 are still left without an offer after round 2: all seats have 
already been taken at their second preferred university (u2). 
Step 3: Applicants a3 and a5 are still unassigned and hence their third 
preference is considered. Applicant a5 can be admitted to university u3. Applicant 
a3, by contrast, cannot be admitted. He remains unassigned even though there is 
one seat left at university u4. 
The algorithm does not eliminate justified envy in that applicant a3
prefers to be admitted to university u2 instead of remaining unassigned, and 
university u2 prefers a3 over applicant a1 whom it has admitted (as a3 has the 
better grade). In this example it is clear that applicants have an incentive to 
misrepresent their preferences. Applicant a3, for instance, could have been 
assigned to her second preferred university by changing her stated ranking. She 
could have secured herself a seat at university u2 by ranking it first. Thus, the 
algorithm in procedure A is not strategy-proof. 
Example 2  
(adapted from an example by Ergin and Sönmez, 2006). 
For a given subject (e.g., medicine), there are three universities, X, Y, and Z. Each 
of them has 100 slots and 100 students in its vicinity for which the university is 
the closest university offering medicine. Assume that the criterion “proximity of a 
university to the parents’ house” becomes decisive. Suppose further that 
university Z is the least preferred university from the perspective of all students 
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and in every area 50 students prefer university X over Y and 50 students prefer 
university Y over X.  
Now consider a student who lives in the vicinity of university X but who 
prefers Y over X. If she lists Y first on her list, she loses priority at X. Thus, if she 
does not get a seat at university Y, it will be difficult to get a seat at X, and she 
will possibly end up at Z. The safe strategy in this situation is to rank X first 
where the student has priority. Notice that the more students from area Y rank 
university Y first, the more advisable it becomes for the student living in the area 
of X not to list Y first, but to make the safe choice of X. It is therefore an 
equilibrium for every student to list her home university first. In this equilibrium, 
every student is assigned to her home university. But it is possible to allocate all 
students living in the vicinity of university X or Y to their first choice. Thus, all 
students who prefer university X but live in the area of Y could be offered a seat 
at X, and conversely, all students who prefer university Y but live in area X could 
be offered a seat at Y. This allocation Pareto-dominates the allocation under 
which every student is assigned to her home university. 
References 
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila (2005): College Admissions with Affirmative Action. 
International Journal of Game Theory 33, 535-549. 
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth and Tayfun Sönmez 
(2006): Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism. NBER Working 
Paper No. 11965. 
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila and Tayfun Sönmez (2003): School Choice: A Mechanism 
Design Approach. American Economic Review 93, 729-747. 
Alcalde, José and Salvador Barberà (1994): Top Dominance and the Possibility of 
Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems. Economic Theory 4, 
417-435. 
Avery, Christopher, Andrew Fairbanks and Richard Zeckhauser (2004). The Early 
Admissions Game: Joining the Elite. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
MA. 
Balinski, Michel and Tayfun Sönmez (1999): A Tale of Two Mechanisms: 
Student Placement. Journal of Economic Theory 84, 73-94. 
33
Braun et al.: Telling the Truth May Not Pay Off
Bereitgestellt von | Technische Universität Berlin
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 01.10.18 11:53
Braun, Sebastian and Nadja Dwenger (2009): Determinants of Success in the 
Centralised University Admission System in Germany: Regional 
Provenance Matters. Higher Education: The International Journal of 
Higher Education and Educational Planning, 58(1), 71-80. 
Chen, Yan and Tayfun Sönmez (2006): School Choice: An Experimental Study. 
Journal of Economic Theory 127, 202-231. 
Collins, Susan and Kala Krishna (1997): The Harvard Housing Lottery: 
Rationality and Reform. Mimeo. 
Ergin, Haluk and Tayfun Sönmez (2006): Games of School Choice under the 
Boston Mechanism. Journal of Public Economics 90, 215-237. 
Gale, David and Lloyd Shapley (1962): College Admissions and the Stability of 
Marriage. American Mathematical Monthly 69, 9-15. 
Pathak, Parag A. and Tayfun Sönmez (2008). Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere 
and Strategic Players in the Boston Mechanism. American Economic 
Review 98, 1636-52. 
Pais, Joana and Ágnes Pintér (2008). School Choice and Information: An 
Experimental Study on Matching Mechanisms. Games and Economic 
Behavior 64, 303-328. 
Roth, Alvin E. (1982): The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives. 
Mathematics of Operations Research 7, 617-628. 
Roth, Alvin E. (1985): The College Admissions Problem is Not Equivalent to the 
Marriage Problem. Journal of Economic Theory 36, 277-288. 
Roth, Alvin E. (1991): A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry-level 
Labor Markets: Regional Markets for New Physicians and Surgeons in U.K. 
American Economic Review 81, 441-464. 
Roth, Alvin E. (2008): Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, 
Practice, and Open Questions. International Journal of Game Theory 36, 
537-569. 
34
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 10 [2010], Iss. 1 (Advances), Art. 22
Bereitgestellt von | Technische Universität Berlin
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 01.10.18 11:53
Roth, Alvin E. and Elliott Peranson (1999): The Redesign of the Matching Market 
for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design. 
American Economic Review 89, 748-780. 
Roth, Alvin E. and Uriel G. Rothblum (1999): Truncation Strategies in Matching 
Markets-in search of Advice for Participants. Econometrica 67, 21-43. 
Roth, Alvin E. and Marilda A. Oliveira Sotomayor (1990): Two-sided matching – 
A study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis, Cambridge University 
Press. 
Roth, Alvin E. and John H. Vande Vate (1991): Incentives in Two-Sided 
Matching with Random Stable Mechanisms. Economic Theory 1, 31-44. 
Westkamp, Alexander (2009): Failures in the German College Admissions 
System. Mimeo. 
Wissenschaftsrat [German Council of Science and Humanities] (2004): 
Empfehlungen des Wissenschaftsrats zur Reform des Hochschulzugangs 
vom 30.1.2004. http://www.wissenschaftsrat.de/texte/5920-04.pdf. 
Zentralstelle für die Vergabe von Studienplätzen (2006a): Die neuen 
Zulassungsregeln im Überblick. http://www.zvs.de/Service/Download/ 
Regeln_abWS_2005.pdf 
Zentralstelle für die Vergabe von Studienplätzen (2006b): Die Entscheidung über 
den Studienort. http://www.zvs.de/Service/Download/M13.pdf 
Zentralstelle für die Vergabe von Studienplätzen (2006c): Angebot- und 
Nachfrage nach Studienplätzen in den bundesweit zulassungsbeschränkten 
Studiengängen Wintersemester 2006/2007. http://www.zvs.de/Service/ 
Download/ Bew_001_Gesamt_WS2006.pdf 
35
Braun et al.: Telling the Truth May Not Pay Off
Bereitgestellt von | Technische Universität Berlin
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 01.10.18 11:53
